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Summary  findings
Bakoup and Tarr qiuantify  the impact on Cameroon of  They find that better access to partner  markets and
three aspects of its new regional trade agreement with  reduction of the external tariff explain  virtually all of
the C(entral  African Economic and Monetary Community  Cameroon's  welfare gain.
(the CE.MAC  agreement):  In their preferred scenario (Calrneroon haviing  regional
* Improved access to markets in CEMAC.  market power), reduction-  of the external tariff explains
* Preferential tariff reduction.  three-quarters of the welfare gain.
* Reduction of its external tariff through  If Cameroon further reduces tariffs to its regional
implementation of the commoni  external tariff of  partners, the effect on its economny  is a loss of real
CEMAC.  income but the impact is negligible.
They estimate that Cameroon will gain from the  Should Cameroom's  partners fail to provide tariff-free
igreement but show hiow  Cameroon's  regional market  access  to their markets, Bakoup and Tarr estimate that,
power greatly affects the magnitude of its gains. They  given Cameroon's  regional market power, Cameroon
assume that Cameroon has regional miarket  power in  would gain even more from free trade than it wotild
both imports and exports despite being smalll  in world  from implementing the CEMAC arrangenients.
markets.
'I'his paper-a  product of the D)evelopment  Research Group --  is part of a larger effort in the group to investigate the
implications of regional trade arrangemnents.  Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Lili Tahada, room MC3-333, telephone 202-473-6896,  fax 202-522-l159,
Internet address ltabadai(fworldbank.org. Jantiary 1998. (46 pages)
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papers  carr  the namnes  'f  the aut(rs  aind  shoiuld he cited accordinigly.  1he findinigs,  intepretations,  and conclusions expresse,ld  ithis
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cilintries they re  present.
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World Bank, Room NS-037
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433I. Introduction
Africa has joined the world-wide rush of the 1990s to implement or strengthen preferential
trading arrangements. This includes the Cross-Border Initiative among 19 African countries', the
eleven country South African Development Community (SADC) 2, the Maghreb customs union in
North Africa 3 and reciprocal free trade agreements  between Morocco and Tunisia with the European
Union. In central Africa, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Central African Republic
and Chad have strengthened the relationships of UDEAC with the formation in 1994 of the Central
*Bakoup  is Macro-Economist,  African  Development  Bank;  Tarr  is  Lead  Economist,  World  Bank.  This
paper  is based  on  Bakoup's  doctoral  dissertation  (Bakoup,  1996).  The  authors  would  like  acknowledge  the  help  of
Henri Francois  Henner,  Dominique  van Mensbrugge,  Larry  Hinkle,  Philippe  Callier,  John Mcintire,  Minerva  Patena
and seminar  participants  at the World  Bank. The views  expressed  are those of the authors  and do not necessarily
reflect  those of the African  Development  Bank,  the World  Bank or the Executive  Directors  of either Bank.
'Participating  countries  are Angola,  Burundi,  Comoros,  Djibouti,  Ethiopia,  Kenya,  Madagascar,  Mauritius,
Mozambique,  Malawi,  Namibia,  Rwanda,  Seychelles,  South  Africa,  Swaziland,  Tanzania,  Uganda,  Zambia  and
Zimbabwe.  Countries  agree  to eliminate  regional  tariff and non-tariff  barriers,  and to harmonize  external  tariffs with
no tariff above  20-25  percent.
2Participating  countries  are: Angola,  Botswana,  Lesotho,  Malawi,  Mozambique,  Namibia,  Swaziland,
South  Africa,  Tanzania,  Zambia  and  Zimbabwe.  These  countries  intend  to establish  a free trade area.
3This  includes  Algeria,  Libya,  Mauritania,  Morocco  and Tunisia.
-1  -African  Economic and  Monetary  Community (known by its  French  acronym  "CEMAC" for
Communaute Economique et Monetaire d'Afrique Centrale).
Many would assess the past arrangements in Africa as having encouraged  harmful import-
substitution (see, for example, Foroutan, 1993); moreover they did not led to a significant increase
in intra-regional trade 4. In view of the rather pessimistic assessment of Africa's  experience with
regional preferential trading arrangements,  one must pause to consider whether the new rush toward
regionalism arrangements is well advised. Those who defend the present trend would argue that the
arrangements of the 1990s constitute "new regionalism." By this it is meant that there are aspects of
"deep integration" to many of these agreements in that some contemplate elements such as free
movement of factors, standards harmonization, and monetary integration.  Most importantly, these
agreements intend to abandon the harmful import-substitution policies of the past and accompany
regional tariff preferences with a reduction of external protection as well.
Despite the existence of many quantitative evaluations of regional trading arrangements in
other parts of the world, 5 we are not aware of any such evaluations in sub-Saharan Africa.  In this
paper we focus on the CEMAC arrangements and, in particular, we quantitatively assess its impact
on its largest member: Cameroon. In order to ascertain the source of the gains and losses from
CEMAC, however, we quantitatively decompose the impacts of its  three most clear elements on
Cameroon:  (1) Cameroon's elimination of tariffs on imLports  from its regional partners; (2) the
'See  Robson  (1987)  for  data  that  show  that  intra-regional  trade  has  been  very  small.
5For  example,  see  Francois  and  Shiells  (1993)  for  numerous  evaluations  of NAFTA;  Harrison,  Rutherford
and  Tarr  (1997a)  and  Rutherford,  Rutstrom  and  Tarr  (1997)  for  evaluations  of  European  Union  agreements  with
Turkey  and  Morocco;  Harrison,  Rutherford  and  Tarr  (1997b)  for  an evaluation  of Chile's  options  with
MERCOSUR  and  NAFTA;  and  Harrison,  Rutherford  and  Tarr  (1996)  and Smith  and  Venables  (1988)  for an
evaluation  of the  European  Union's  single  market  program.
-2-elimination  of tariffs on Cameroon's exports by its regional partners; and (3) the reduction of
Cameroon's  tariff  on its imports from the rest  of the world. We also estimate the effects on
Cameroon of unilateral trade liberalization and compare this to  joining CEMAC.
Even though Cameroon is small on world markets, Cameroon constitutes about 50 percent
of the size of the combined CEMAC market--thus is likely possesses market power on regional
markets under the CEMAC tariff umbrella.  A methodological innovation of this paper is that our
results incorporate, in an otherwise small open economy model, the fact that Cameroon may possess
regional market power, and we assess the difference  in results with models with no regional market
power.
Our results for the central elasticity case are summarized in table 5. We find that Cameroon
will gain between 0.41 and 0.62 percent of its GDP by implementing  the CEMAC arrangements. Our
decomposition of results shows that the part of the agreement that calls for further preferential
reduction  of tariffs is immiserizing, although given the low level of intra-regional imports, the
quantitative  impact is quite small. We verify the Wonnocott and Wonnocott (1981) result that
improved  access  to  partner  country markets  is  important in  assessing  the  impact  of  these
arrangements: in our preferred market power case, about one-quarter of the gains to Cameroon derive
from improved access to partner country markets. We find, however, that about three-quarters of the
gains  come  from reduction  of Cameroon's  tariff  against the rest of  the world, i.e., the  new
regionalism  aspect  of CEMAC  is  its most  important element.  Moreover,  our estimates  for
Cameroon's  unilateral trade liberalization show that it can gain marginally even more from full
unilateral trade liberalization than it can from implementation of the CEMAC arrangements, even
though with unilateral trade liberalization it must forego the benefits of improved access to regional
-3-markets. 6
In section  II we graphically  analyze  the welfare  economics  of preferential  trade agreements,
as a function  of whether  or not the home  country  has market  power  in regional  markets  for either its
imports or exports. 'We  show that the impact having regional  market power on imports on the
welfare effects of regional  integration  is ambiguous.  On the other hand, we show that regional
market  power  on exports  unambiguously  reduces  the gains  from a given  tariff reduction  by partners
in a regional arrangement.  These theoretical  results are crucial  to understanding  our numerical
estimates.
In section III we discuss the institutional  background  which led up to the reforns of
CEMAC. We  briefly characterize the  model, data and elasticities in  section IV.  (A full
characterization  of the model equations  is available  in an appendix.)  We focus on interpretation  of
results in section  V and provide  a brief conclusion  in section  VI.
[I. The Welfare  Economics  of Preferential  Trade  Agreements:
with and without  regional  market  power
In this section  we derive,  through  graphical  techniques,  some  new theoretical  results  which
are important  in interpreting  our numerical  results. Apart  from  the partial equilibrium  nature  of the
diagrams,  they represent  the type of model  structure  we employ.  We assume  that the home country
is srnall  on world markets.  In regional  markets,  we consider  both the case where  the home country
has market  power  in the region and the case  where  it does  not, and we compare  results. In order  to
60ur estimates are done with a comparative static model. Regarding the estimates of the gains from free
trade, these are likely to be much larger in a dynamic model that incorporates the endogenous growth effect of trade
liberalization. See Rutherford and Tarr (1997) for an example.
-4-facilitate  comparison,  we depict  both cases  on one  diagram. 7
We show  that when considering  the impact  on welfare  of a regional  trade agreement,  there
is an asymmetry  in the impact on having regional  market power on either exports or imports:
possessing regional market power on  exports lowers the gains from the  preferential trade
arrangement;  but possessing  regional  market  power  on imports  has an ambiguous  effect.
Impact  of the Home Country's Tariff Preferences
The Model. To  be consistent  with  the data  that shows  both  imports  and exports  of the same
product  group at a fairly  disaggregated  level,  we assume  that goods  are differentiated  by country  of
origin (the Armington  assumption). In Figure 1, the home country's demand  for a representative
good from the partner  country  is measured  to the right  of the origin  and its demand  for the similar,
but not identical, good from  the rest  of the world  is measured  to the left of the origin. Without  loss
of generality, we choose  units so  that  the world  price  of both  the large  partner  country  good  and the
good  from the rest of the world is unity in the initial  equilibrium. We assume  that  the preferential
trade area  is not yet implemented  in the initial  equilibrium,  so that  the ad valorem  tariff  rate  t applies
to imports  from both sources.
When there is no regional  market power on imports,  the partner country's  tariff-ridden
supply  curve  is perfectly  elastic,  shown  by the dotted  line  at P = l+t. When  there is regional  market
power  on imports,  the partner  country's  supply  curve  is upward  sloping, depicted  by the solid line
S[P/(l+t)].  Since  both  models  must  represent  the initial  data  point  as an equilibrium,  the tariff  ridden
7See  Bhagwati  and Panagariya  [1996]  for a treatment  of several  other  cases.
-5-supply curve of the  partner country in the presence of market power, intersects the demand curve
for partner country imports where the initial market price, P = l+t, and the initial quantity, QO,  are
the same as with perfectly elastic supply curves.  Then in both cases, the initial tariff revenue from
partner imports is the area T 3 + D and tariff revenue from non-partner imports is T, + T2 + To .
Consider a  preferential reduction in the tariff on partner country imports from t to 0. In the
case on no market power, this results in an increase in the quantity demanded for partner country
imports from QO  to Ql. Since imports from the rest of the world are gross substitutes with partner
country imports, there is a downward shift in demand for imports from the rest of the world to dotted
line M'R  In the new equilibrium the quantity demanded of imports from the rest of the world
declines from Ro  to R,.
Welfare Results: No Market Power on Import Demand. Although we employ Hicksian
equivalent variation in our model, following Willig [1976] we approximate the welfare impact in
Figure  1 using consumer's  surplus analysis. First consider the  case of no market power.  In the
market for partner country imports, consumer surplus increases by the area A + B + C + D + T3 .
There is a loss in tariff revenue equal to the area D + T3 , yielding a "trade creation" triangle A+B+C.
In the market for imports from the rest of the world, there is a loss of "surplus"  equal to the lost tariff
revenue (the "trade diversion" effect), which is the area T, + T2. All tariff loss is a loss in welfare to
the home country since either the government will have to generate this revenue or cut transfers to
compensate. I Thus, the net change in welfare is equal to A+B+C-T 1 - T2. It is well known that the
8Our quantitative  analysis,  which  is general  equilibrium,  incorporates  the welfare  changes  from  all goods.
For our graphical  analysis,  following  Harberger  [1971],  we ignore  the market  for the home country's gou,  1J
other  products,  presuming  there is no difference  between  price and  marginal  cost.
-6-sign is ambiguous  in general.  Figure 1, however,  highlights  how the parameters  affect  the results.
First, if the tariff on imports  from the rest of the world is lowered,  the rectangle  of  trade
diversion  will be smaller. In the limit, the home country  can eliminate  trade diversion  completely
by going  to free trade on imports  from the rest of the world.  Thus, one disadvantage  of a customs
union over a free trade area is that the home country  gives  up its autonomous  ability  to reduce  its
tariffs and trade diversion  on imports from the rest of the world. Second, if products from the
partner  country  and  the rest  of the world  are very good  substitutes,  the trade  diversion  rectangle  will
be relatively large. 9 It is for this reason that our estimates of the gains from regional trade
arrangements  decrease as we increase  the assumed  trade elasticities.  Finally, if home country
products  and imports  are good substitutes  (0DM  in our model),  it is more  likely  that  preferential  trade
arrangements  will be beneficial,  since  then  the demand  curves  in Figure  1 will be relatively  flat and
the area A + B + C will be larger.
Welfare Results: Market Power on Imports. After a free trade  agreement is implemented
with the market power with respect to regional imports, the price of partner country imports falls to
P', which exceeds P = 1 in the no market power case due to the upward sloping supply curve. The
quantity  of  partner country imports increases by less than in the large partner country  case,
increasing to Q'. Since the price of partner country imports falls less, the inward shift in the demand
for imports from the rest of the world is less as well, shifting down to  the solid line M'R rather than
M'R-
Regarding  the welfare effects, consumers  gain the area A + D in the market for partner
91n our model this is measured by the cross elasticity of demand between partner country imports and rest
of the world imports, a,,M.
-7-country  imports,  but  there is a loss of tariff  revenue  equal  to D + T3. In the market  for imports  from
the rest of the world, there is a loss of tariff revenue equal  to the area Tl.  Thus, the net welfare
impact is equal to the area A - T3 - T,. The sign of this sum is also ambiguous  in general,  but the
impact  of the parameters  on the results in comparable  to the large  partner country  case.
Comparing the Cases: With or Without Market Power on Regional Imports. There is
an adverse  terms-of-trade  shift  in the regional  market  power  case,  since  the supply  price from  partner
country  suppliers  is PI>1.  As a result, there is a reduction  in consumers'  surplus  compared  to the
no market  power  case  equal  to the sum  of three areas  in Figure 1: T 3 + B + C.  On the other  hand,
the loss of tariff  revenue  in the market  for imports  from the rest of the world is less in the regional
market power case by the area of rectangle  T 2. Thus, ignoring  export markets,  the home country
will gain  more  from a preferential  trade  arrangement  with a large country  if and only if the adverse
terms-of-trade  loss exceeds  the extra costs of trade diversion,  i.e.,  T3 + B + C > T2. Thus, it is
ambiguous  whether  possession  of regional  market  power  is preferable.
Note also that  the area  T3+ B represents  a gain of producers'  surplus  to exporters  from the
partner country,  so it is not dead-weight  loss to the region. Then, (ignoring  home country  export
access)  the net welfare  difference  to the combined  producers  and consumers  of the preferential  trade
area is C - T2, where,  for the region, partnership  with no regional  market  power is better  than with
regional market power  if this difference  is positive.  The rectangle  T2  measures  the reduced  trade
diversion  in the small  country  case.  The  triangle  C is analogous  to a dead-weight  loss  triangle  which
arises from importing from an alternate  inefficient  supplier. In this case, the dead-weight  loss
triangle  arises  from a hypothetical  comparison  to a supplier  with a perfectly  elastic supply  curve at
price P = 1.
-8-Impact of Preferred Access to Partner Country Markets
One important element that is missing from figure 1 is the value to the home country of
improved access to the markets of the partner country. In figure 2 we analyze the impact of tariff
preferences  in regional markets.  SS is the supply curve of the home country to partner country
markets.
The demand for partner country exports depends on whether the home country faces perfectly
elastic or downward sloping demand curves for its exports in partner markets. In the case where the
partner countries are large, the home country is a price taker, and initial demand is depicted by the
dotted line P/(l+t).  The initial equilibrium quantity and price are E. and P/(l+t),  and initial tariff
revenue,  which  is  collected  by  partner  countries, is  the  area ABGF.  Removal  of  the  tariff
preferentially  increases the  demand for home country exports to  the dotted line  P. The new
equilibrium is at El, P. Producers' surplus for the home country increases by the area ABEF, which
is decomposed as the rectangle ABGF, which is a transfer of initial tariff revenue of partner countries
to home country exporters and a triangle BGE.10
If the home country is not a price taker in regional markets, initial demand for home country
exports  in partner  countries  is the tariff ridden demand  curve, represented  by the  solid  line
DRE/(l+t), where  DREG  is the corresponding demand curve without a tariff applied to home country
exports. The assure a fair comparison between the price taker and market power cases, , the demand
curves are drawn such that both cases are consistent with the initial equilibrium quantity and price
of E. and P/(l+t),  respectively and initial tariff revenue of ABGF.
10  This is not a typical  triangle  of efficiency  gains due  to the possibility  of trade diversion.
-9-When  partner  countries  eliminate the  tariff  against  home  country  exports,  the  new
equilibrium quantity and price are E' and D.  Producers' surplus of the home country expands to
ABCD. Thus the gain in producers surplus for the home country is less when partner countries have
downward sloping demand curves and the difference  in welfare between the price taking and market
power cases is DCEF. With market power, the price does not rise as much since with a downward
sloping demand curve, the home country must accept a lower price to increase the quantity supplied.
Thus, it is unambiguous that the value to the home country of a given level of preferential tariff
reduction will be greater with no market power on its exports in regional markets.
III. The Institutional Background to the CEMAC Reform
A brief review of the events that led up to the formation of CEMAC will help explain the
choice of some of the parameter values in the modelling and place the quantitative work in context.
The pre-reform trade regime: the UDEAC Experience
The data for our model comes from 1989 to 1993, during which time Cameroon, Congo,
Gabon, Central African Republic, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea participated in the Union Douaniere
et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC). UDEAC was formed in 1964 with the objective of
promoting economic integration among the members. Although per capita income is relatively low
in all six countries, as table 1 indicates Cameroon accounts for more than 54% of the GDP of the
entire Union, and its population is 50% of the Union. Under the treaty establishing the union, the
member  countries were to progressively liberalize their trade with other members, encourage
freedom of movement for factors of production and coordinate  their economic policies.  Indeed, the
-10-treaty reads like that of a common market, even if in reality the major, if not the sole, vehicle of
integration was liberalization of intra-regional trade.
External Trade. As regard trade with outside countries, the treaty establishing  UDEAC
called for implementation of a common external tariff. UDEAC countries had in common three
different levies on imports:  an import duty,  an entry duty, a duty on import turnover.  But in
addition there was a fourth levy, the complementary tax, whose rate was determined independently
by each country. Although Samen (1988) has shown that actual MFN duties did not differ greatly
across countries, as a result of the complementary tax there never was a common external tariff.
Most importantly, the UDEAC countries including Cameroon had a highly protective MFN trade
regime. In the case of Cameroon, its tariff rates ranged from  2.5 percent to 150 percent.
Regional Trade. In 1965 the Union introduced a scheme to liberalize intra-regional trade
based on what was called the single tax regime, and Cameroon's regional trade was governed by this
system.  Under this scheme, goods that had the potential of entering intra-regional trade were
classified into two broad categories: The first category consisted of primary products ( produits du
cru ) whose movement within the union was free of any duty. The second category consisted of all
manufactured goods produced in one member country for regional export".  The scheme required
that these goods be subject to the single tax.  Manufactured goods that had not won the single tax
status were prohibited from trade within the union. In other words, there was no instance were a
good manufactured in a union member could be exported to other union members unless it were
" Strict  UDEAC  policy  on this matter considered  as goods  produced  in one member  country  those goods
that had a minimum  of 40% of their value  accounted  for by the domestic  production  process.  This  rule was not,
however,  rigorously  followed  and granting  the single  tax regime  to goods that had only  20% of domestic  value  was
not uncommon  practice.
-11-classified as a single tax good.  The single tax replaced all other import duties and domestic taxes
on inputs used in the production of single tax goods, and was levied on a destination basis.  The rate
of the single tax applied on a product was determined on a case by case basis and would normally
vary with the good, the producing country, the importing country and even the producing firm.  The
single tax was generally lower than the rate that would have resulted from the application of MFN
treatment, and was collected by the customs of the importing country" 2. But no discernible and
stable relationship between these two rates was found.
In practice the single  tax proved a very inefficient instrument for liberalizing intra-union
trade.  First of all, firms had to apply individually for the single  tax status which was granted on a
case by case basis, and its rate varied greatly across firms, across products and also across member
countries.  The unpredictable character and the cumbersome administrative process through which
firms  had  to go to apply and obtain the single  tax status may well have hindered rather than
promoted intra-regional trade.
The Formation of CEMAC
CEMAC was formed following the events that led to the devaluation of the CFA Franc. 13
12 At  the  time  of its introduction,  the  single  tax  was  collected  on origin  basis  by the  exporting  union
member.  In 1973  the system  was replaced  by the destination  principle  whereby  the tax was collected  by the
importing  union  member.
13 The six CEMAC  countries  also  participate  in a monetary  union  through  their membership  in the Banque
des Etats  de I A.frique  Centrale  (BEAC). BEAC  is one of two central  banks  responsible  for the administration  of
monetary  policy in the CFA zone,  the other  being the Banque  Centrale  des  Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO).
The CFA zone brings  together  France  and fourteen  African  countries  (the six members  of CEMAC,  seven in west
Africa,  which are Benin,  Burkina  Faso,  Ivory  Coast,  Mali,  Niger, Senegal  and Togo,  as well as Comoros)  into a
monetary  arrangement  whereby  these countries'  currency  the CFA Franc  is pegged  to the French  Franc and two
compte  d 'operations  opened  at the French  treasury  to help sustain  the exchange  rate  between  the  French  Franc  and
the CFA Franc. For a comprehensive  description  of the Franc  zone see Guillaumont  and Guillaumont  (1984).
-12-The CFA Franc  had been  pegged  to the French  Franc (FF) at the rate  of 1FF  for 50 CFA Franc  for
almost  forty-six  years.  In comparison  to other  African  countries,  economic  performance  of the CFA
zone countries was generally  favorable,  until the mid-1980s. However,  several factors,' 4 most
notably  the appreciation  of the French  Franc  vis-a-vis  the U.S dollar  and other  major currencies  led
to real  appreciation  of the CFA  Franc,  poor  external  performance  of the member  countries  compared
with other  African  countries  and  increasingly  placed  unsustainable  pressures  on the above  mentioned
parity.  After a decade  of real economic  decline,  the CFA  Franc  was therefore  devalued  effective  on
January 12, 1994. (See Devarajan  and de Melo,  1987; 1991 and Eldabawi  and Majd, 1996 for
empirical  analyses  of the impact  of CFA zone  participation.)
Following  the devaluation,  the CEMAC  countries  rapidly  implemented  policies  aimed  at the
total elimination  of barriers  to regional  trade and a reduction  in the common  external  tariff." 5 In
particular,'  the CEMAC  agreement  calls for: the abolition  of the taxe unique;  the implementation
of a common  external  tariff with four  rates  on member's  imports  from  nonmember  countries  which
will substitute  for all imports  duties;  CEMAC  members  were required  to eliminate  all unjustified
exemptions  in order  to strengthen  their  fiscal  position;  and  the implementation  of a TarifPreferentiel
Generalise  (TPG),  equal  to 20%  of the corresponding  common  external  tariff  on member's imports
from other  members,  which  is to be progressively  phased  out within  five years. The goal therefore
was complete  free trade within the zone.
14Other relevant factors included changes in oil exports and the terms of trade. On the impact of oil exports
in Cameroon on the real exchange rate and sectoral output, see Benjamin, Devarajan and Weiner (1989).
15  Cameroon introduced the reform in February 1994, Congo in April 1994, Gabon in February 1994,
Chad in June 1994, Equatorial Guinea in August 1994 and Central African Republic in April 1994. The reforms
were originally agreed in June 1993 in Libreville.
-13-IV. Model,  Data  and Elasticities
Summary  of the Model
A full listing of the equations and variables of the model are in an appendix. With a couple
of exceptions our model follows closely the "small open economy" model described in detail in de
Melo and Tarr (1992).  6 We assume that Cameroon is small in relation to the rest of the world and
therefore faces fixed terms-of-trade with respect to the rest of the world. The only distortion in the
model is the existence of tariffs on imported goods imposed by the government,  the proceeds of
which are redistributed to consumers in a lump sum.  Trade flows are distinguished by origin for
imports and destination for exports. The economy is decomposed into three sectors: agriculture,
industry and services, with both intermediate and final use of all goods. Factors of production are
intersectorally mobile, but the total supply of each factor is  fixed. Production functions are subject
to constant returns to scale.  All agents, consumers, firms and factor owners, maximize welfare,
profits or their returns, under perfectly competitive conditions.
The key departure from the de Melo and Tarr model is that, in order to analyze regional trade
preferences, we decompose Cameroon's trade into trade with CEMAC and trade with the rest of the
world.  Imports tariffs on goods from regional partners may be, and typically are, different from
those on imports from the rest of the world. When there is no regional market power, improved
access to  the markets of regional partners is handled by exogenously increasing the price that
16The  model  also  closely  resembles  the  structure  of a previous  CGE  model  of Cameroon:  the one  employed
in Benjamin,  Devarajan  and Weiner  (1989).  Our  model  is an  updated  version  of the  Benjamin  et al.  model,  although
it contains  fewer  sectors.
-14-Cameroonian exporters obtain in the markets of  partners countries (see below for the regional
market power case).  In this respect the model follows more closely the models of Rutherford,
Rutstrom and Tarr (1997) and Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1  997a).
The key modelling innovation in this paper is that we allow Cameroon to have market power
on its regional trade even though it has none with respect to the rest of the world."7  The supply of
imports from CEMAC to Cameroon may be upward sloping; therefore the tariff ridden supply curve
from CEMAC is a function of Cameroon's tariff. Similarly, the quantity of Cameroon's exports
demanded by CEMAC may depend on the price charged by Cameroon. Formally, when Cameroon
possesses market power in its import demand from the region, the supply of imports from the region
is expressed as:
Regional Import Supply with Market Power:  Si = Ci [Pi/(l+ti)]Wi
where Si is the quantity of sector i imports supplied by regional partners, Pi is the tariff inclusive
market price paid by Cameroonian consumers for regional imports in sector i, ti is the ad valo rem
tariff rate imposed on sector i imports from the region by Cameroon (therefore P1/(1+t1) is the price
received by regional exporters in Cameroon), *i is the elasticity of supply for sector i imports by
regional partners, and C 1 is a constant that varies by sector. Elimination of the regional tariff by
Cameroon, shifts the tariff ridden regional supply curves in each sector out and to the right.
Similarly, when Cameroon is assumed to possess market power on its regional exports,
demand for its exports in the region in sector i is represented as:
17See  de Melo  and  Tarr  (1992)  for  an example  of a small  open  economy  model  with  market  power;  but it
has  not  been  applied  in small  open  economy  models  of  regional  trading  arrangements.
-15-Regional  Export Demand  with Market  Power:  Ei =K,/[Pi(1+Q1)]
where E; is the quantity  of Cameroonian  exports  demanded  in the regional  market,  Pi is the price
received by exporters  from Cameroon,  t; is the ad valorem  tariff rate imposed  on sector i exports
from Cameroon  in the region, 7ci  the elasticity  of demand  for sector i exports  from Cameroon  in
CEMAC,  and K; is a constant  that varies by sector.  Implementation  of the CEMAC  arrangements
implies  that the tariff rate applied  against  Cameroonian  exports  will be reduced  (see below for the
data details),  thereby shifting  demand  for Cameroonian  exports  in CEMAC  out and to the right.
Tariff Rates Chosen  in the Model
In table 3 we present  the tariff rates  that we employ  in the benchmark  equilibrium  and the
policy counterfactuals.  The structure  of the import  tariff rates  was obtained  from legal tariff rates,
but we adjusted  the legal tariff rates  to reflect  the actual collected  rates  as follows.
For the benchmark  equilibrium,  we employed  the estimates  of Semen  (1988)  to obtain  the
structure of legal tariffs  rates that Cameroon  applied on intermediate  and consumption  goods
imported  from the rest of the world;  Semen  shows  that both for both Cameroon  and its partners  in
UDEAC  these rates followed  closely  the common  external  tariff of UDEAC.  For legal tariff rates
on intermediates  and  consumption  goods imported  from the  region,  we employed  results  from both
Bela (1992)  and unpublished  IMF  estimates.  These  studies  combined  gave  us the structure  of tariffs,
intermediate  versus consumption  goods and regional  versus  rest of world.
Due  to a large  number  of exemptions,  however,  the actual  coliected  duties  were  considerably
less than  what is implied  by the legal  rates. Based  on data  we received  from  the Ministry  of Finance
-16-of Cameroon,  we have that the actual aggregate  collected  duties  were equal to 20.9 percent of the
value of imports  in fiscal  year 1992-1993;  and collected  duties  were  equal  to 10.7  percent  of imports
in fiscal  year 1996-1997.  This shows  that  the CEMAC  reforms  have led to a reduction  in collected
duties. In our view,  the collected  rates  present  a more accurate  view of the protection  provided  to
industries  and the costs  to consumers  and  finns of import  protection.  Thus, it is important  to adjust
the legal rates  to reflect  the collections.  Since  we do not  have  data  on collected  rates  by intermediates
versus consumption  goods,  in order  to obtain  our pre-reform  (or benchmark)  tariff rates of table 3,
we scaled  down  the structure  of the legal tariff  rates  proportionately  such  that the weighted  average
tariff rates equal  to the collected  rate of 20.9 percent.  For the CEMAC  compliance  scenarios,  we
set all regional tariffs equal to zero and  then scaled  down the legal rates on rest of world imports
such  that the weighted  average  tariff rate  was equal to 10.7  percent,  the post-reform  collected  rate.
For the pre-reform  tariff rates  that applied  on exports  of Cameroon  to its regional  partners,
we employed the estimates of a World Bank study of UDEAC; it indicates that on average,
Cameroon's exports faced a tariff of 22 percent in the region.  If Cameroon's  regional partners
conform to the arrangements  of CEMAC,  Cameroon  will obtain  tariff free access  to the CEMAC
markets, i.e., there will be a reduction  of tariffs facing Cameroonian  exporters  by 22 percent.
Cameroonian  exporters  cannot  expect,  however, to receive  a price increase  of the full 22 percent
on their regional  exports, since  the common  extemal  tariff of CEMAC  is also being reduced.  The
reduction in the external  tariff by Cameroon's partners in CEMAC  implies that the increase  in
demand  that Cameroon  will obtain  from the elimination  of the 22 percent  tariff against  its exports,
will be eroded  due to increased  competition  in the regional  markets  from rest of world imports,  i.e.,
there will be a partially offsetting  shift down in the demand curve for the regional exports of
-17-Cameroon due to the tariff reduction on rest of world imports. Given that Cameroon and its partners
start from  the common external tariff of UDEAC and move to the common external tariff  of
CEMAC, we assume that all partners are cutting their external tariffs by about the same percent as
Cameroon (Cameroon is cutting its overall tariff from 20.9 to 10.7 percent). On balance, we assume
that Cameroon will realize a net increase in its demand by 11 percent, i.e, the preferential reduction
of partner country tariffs by 22 percent is eroded by about 50 percent due to partner country tariff
reduction  against imports from the rest of the world. The actual extent of the erosion of the 22
percent  tariff  reduction  against  Cameroon's  region is  dependent on  elasticity  of  substitution
possibilities in the CEMAC markets.
Choice of elasticities
Table  4 presents the values chosen for the elasticities in the model.  Elasticities  of
substitution between capital and labor are based on estimates from Caddy (1976).  For composite
final demand,  we employ the Linear Expenditure System" demand functions. The own price
elasticities  may be derived from estimates of the "minimum  consumption requirements," which were
obtained from the poverty assessment report of the World Bank (1995). For industry and services,
these values are consistent with the estimates of Lluch, Powell and Williams (1977). The elasticities
of substitultion  between imported and domestic goods in final consumption were based on estimates
in Shiells, Stem and Deardorff (1986) and adjusted to reflect  the limited possibilities for substitution
between imports and domestic goods that are usually characteristic of a developing economy like
Cameroon.  Elasticities of substitution between imports from the region and imports from the rest
of the world were interpolated from Faini (1994). The same values were chosen for intermediate
goods.  Elasticities of transformation between domestic supply and exports were also based on
-18-Faini (1994).
Regarding the elasticities  that reflect regional market power on imports and exports, in our
central elasticity case we chose the value of four, which was the value taken by de Melo and Tarr
(1992) for the selected products for which market power was present in their model. These values
were halved and doubled in the low and high elasticity scenarios.
Trade shares
The share of Cameroon's total exports which go to CEMAC and its share of total imports
from  CEMAC are shown in table 2, by sector. As  shown in  figure 2, these values are rather
important to the results. They were calculated from unpublished data provided by the Department
of Statistics and National Accounts of the Cameroonian Ministry of Economy and Finance.  The
original data, which was slightly more disaggregated than the sectors in our model,  provided the
shares of each product category in total trade, intra-regional trade and trade with the rest of the
world, along with the absolute totals for each. We aggregated  these data to obtain the shares relevant
to our model.  In table 1, the aggregate shares of exports  to and imports from the region were
calculated as a weighted average of the shares in table 2.
V. Results
In table 5 we present the results of our policy simulations with our central elasticities. This
involves selection of the policy instruments shown in columns 1-3, the specifics of which are
explained in table 3. The results are dependent on the extent of market power by Cameroon in its
regional markets. As discussed above, however, given the size of Cameroon in its regional markets,
it is likely most appropriate to assume that Cameroon has market power on both its imports and
-19-exports within the region,  despite the fact that it is small in world markets. For the purpose of
decomposing  the results, we present  in column  4 results assuming  the Cameroon  does not possess
any regional  market  power.  We present  in column  5 the estimates  for when Cameroon's  demand  for
regional  imports  is large in relation  to the capacity  of its regional  partners  (but it is not large in its
regional  exports markets).  In column 6 we reverse  the assumption  and assume that Cameroon  is
large in its regional export markets (but not large in its regional import markets).  In column 7,
Cameroon  is large in both its regional  export  and regional  import  markets.
Implementation  of CEMAC.  In row 1  we assume  that Cameroon  and its CEMAC  partners
fully implement  the CEMAC arrangements.  As shown  in column 4, if Cameroon  is assumed  to
possess no regional market power,  we estimate  that it would gain 0.62 percent of its GDP. The
results  in column  5 (a gain  of 0.61  percent  of GDP) show  that there  is very  little difference  between
having  market  power on regional  import  markets  only and  not having  any regional  market power.
In general  the existence  of market  power  on imports  implies  that the country  suffers  a terms of trade
loss from lowering  tariffs,  so the gains  from  trade  liberalization  will be smaller  with market  power.
Our results, however,  are explained  by figure 1, where  we showed  that in the context  of lowering
tariffs  preferentially,  with market  power  in the regional  market  only,  there  is a tradeoff between  the
terms of trade loss from  higher  prices  paid  to partners  for imports,  and  reduced  trade  diversion  costs
from less diversion away  from rest of world imports.  Then whether market power on regional
imports reduces the gains from regional integration,  compared  to no regional market power, is
elasticity  dependent.
With market power on regional exports  only, the gains from regional  integration  decline
substantially  to 0.41 percent  of GDP. This is explained  by figure 2, where  we showed  that there is
-20-a terms of trade loss from facing a downward sloping demand curve for regional exports. Then
compared with being a price taker on regional markets, there is an unambiguous loss of welfare.
When Cameroon possesses market power on both its regional exports and imports, the gain from
implementing  CEMAC is 0.41 percent of its GDP. Thus, virtually all of the reduced gains from
terms of trade losses derive from market power on exports.
Decomposition  of the Results. Since the implementation of the CEMAC arrangements
involve several elements, we separately evaluate the impact of the three most important changes in
the simulations presented in rows 2-4. In row 3 we show that  the isolated impact of Cameroon
lowering its external tariffs is between 0.34 and 0.30 percent of GDP. Thus, as would be expected,
Caameroons' market  power on its regional markets does not have a significant impact on the
estimated gains from tariff reduction with respect to the rest of the world.
In row 2, we evaluate the consequences  of Cameroon obtaining improved preferential access
to the CEMAC markets, i.e., we assume that the tariff against Cameroon's exports is preferentially
reduced by 11 percent. With no market power, the value to Cameroon from improved access is 0.29
percent of GDP, which is almost 50 percent of full implementation of CEMAC (compare to row 1,
column 4). As shown in figure 2, Cameroonian  exporters gain in two ways: a triangle of additional
producers' surplus on their additional sales to the regional market as a result of their improved terms
of trade on exports; and a rectangle of terms of trade gain on their existing sales, as tariff revenue
of the partner countries is converted into producers' surplus. Given that the gains are dependent on
a rectangle of existing sales, the larger are initial sales to the region, the larger will be the gains to
Cameroon from improved preferential access.  When Cameroon possesses market power on its
regional exports, the gains from improved access to regional markets are reduced to 0.11 percent of
-21-GDP. The triangle and rectangle of additional producers' surplus for Cameroonian exporters are of
reduced height due to adverse terms of trade effect. Then the gains from improved regional access
are about 25% of the gains from full implementation of CEMAC with  similar market  power
assumptions  (row  1, column 6). That  is, since the  value of external liberalization  is  largely
unaffected by Cameroon's regional market power, compared to improved regional access, external
liberalization constitutes a larger share of the gains from CEMAC when we assume that Cameroon
possesses market power on its regional export markets.
In row 4, assume that Cameroon eliminates tariffs against its regional partners without
changing it external tariff and without obtaining improved access to regional markets. Cameroon is
estimated to lose from this impact due to the dominance of trade diversion over trade creation in this
case. It is a well known result (originally due to Lipsey, 1958) that, if one holds tariffs against the
rest of the world constant and incrementally  reduce tariffs preferentially, regional tariff preferences
become immiserizing at the margin before regional tariffs go to zero.' 8 Since, as we showed in table
3, Cameroon  already provides  significant tariff preferences to  its  regional partners,  it is not
surprising  that further preferential reduction, while holding external tariffs constant would be
immiserizing.  This  further emphasizes the importance of tariff reduction to  the rest  of world
accompanying the regional preferences.
To examine whether Cameroon's regional tariff preferences are imiriiserizing,  in rows 5a and
5b we vary the regional tariff of Cameroon while we hold the tariff against the rest of world constant
at the CET and unrealistically assume that Cameroon still obtains improved access to regional
I8The result has also been independently established by E}thier  and Horn (1984) and was
shown by Meade (1956) in the framework of global, rather than national, welfare.
-22-markets.  Comparing the results of rows 5a, Sb and row 1, we can assess the optimal regional tariff,
rest of world tariffs and regional access held constant. We estimate that the differences are rather
small, but that Cameroon would be marginally better off if it held its regional tariffs constant at the
level of the benchmark equilibrium. The welfare differences are rather small, because regional
imports by Cameroon are only about two percent of its total imports. The results from rows 4 and
5 are reconciled by again appealing to the theoretical result that incremental preferential tariff
reduction may be beneficial initially, but eventually  becomes immiserizing. in the case of Cameroon,
row 4 shows that preferential reduction below the benchmark tariff level is immiserizing if the tariff
against the rest of the world is not reduced to the CET level;  but row 5 shows that preferential
reduction from the CET to the benchmark level is welfare neutral.
Other Policy Possibilities. In rows 6 and 7, we estimate the impact of unilateral non-
preferential trade liberalization by Cameroon. Lowering tariffs to zero provide greater gains than
lowering tariffs to the level of the common external tariff of CEMAC, which is to be expected since
the bulk of Cameroon's trade is with the rest of the world and Cameroon is a price taker with respect
to the rest of the world.
What is most interesting from a policy perspective  is that in the most realistic case of regional
market power on exports by Cameroon, Cameroon will gain more from lowering tariffs to zero than
from full implementation of CEMAC, i.e., row 7 column 7 exceeds row 1 column 7. An effort by
Cameroon to unilaterally lower its tariffs to zero may be impeded by a conflict with the common
external tariff of CEMAC. If Cameroon chose to drop out of CEMAC, it would have to suffer from
reduced access to the markets of CEMAC. These estimates indicate that the losses that Cameroon
would  suffer from reduced preferential access to  CEMAC are more than compensated by the
-23-additional gains from trade liberalization with the rest of the world." 9
Given the history of incompletely fulfilled trading agreements among developing countries,
it is possible that Cameroon would implement CEMAC arrangements, but that its partners would
not provide preferential access to their markets. The results for this scenario are presented in row 8,
and are little different from row 3, which is the value of external liberalization only. Thus, compared
with full CEMAC implementation by its partners as well, Cameroon would lose from the lack of
improved access to CEMAC markets; but the difference with respect to its regional tariffs are of
second order of importance due to the small quantity of regional imports. Of course, if its regional
partners fail to adhere to the CEMAC agreements, then Cameroon could further lower its external
tariff to obtain further gains.
Finally, in row 9 we consider the impact of old style regional arrangements, where the
common external tariff is not lowered, but Cameroon and its CEMAC partners eliminate tariff
preferences against each other. The gains to Cameroon are comparable to the results in row 2
deriving from improved access.
Sensitivity Analysis. In table 6 we present the results for high and low elasticities. Included
in the elasticities that we change are the elasticities that reflect the extent of market power. These
are doubled and halved in the high and low elasticity scenarios. Higher elasticities generally result
in larger gains since firms and consumers are more responsive to the new incentives, i.e., "Harberger
1 9Moreover, part of the gains to Cameroon from participating in CEMA<' are losses to the rest of CEMAC,
and these  gains are likely  to be larger,  the larger  is the regional  trade surplus.  That is, given Cameroon's  regional
trade surplus,  it suffers  relatively  little  trade diversion  and benefits  from improved  access  on its exports. Suppose
we were to attempt  to extrapolate  these  results  to other  CEMAC  countries  without  estimation.  Unilateral  trade
liberalization  for other CEMAC  countries  who do not run a regional  trade surplus  is likely  to be relatively  better
compared to participation in CEMAC than it is for Cameroon.
-24-triangles" are larger. The pattern across scenarios,  however,  is similar to the central elasticity
scenarios.
VI. Conclusion
We have quantified the impact on Cameroon of three aspects of the CEMAC agreements:
improved access to CEMAC markets, preferential tariff reduction and reduction of external tariffs
through implementation of the common external tariff of CEMAC. We estimate that Camneroon  will
gain between 0.41 and 0.62 percent of GDP, depending on market power assumptions. We find that
improved access to partner markets and reduction of the external tariff explain virtually all of the
welfare gain. In our preferred case of regional market power, external  reduction explains about three-
quarters of the welfare gain. Although we find that further preferential tariff reduction by Cameroon
to its regional partners is immiserizing, the quantitative impact is negligible.
We have also estimated some unilateral trade policy options of Cameroon. In the event that
Cameroon's partners fail to provide tariff free access to their markets, we estimate that ,taking
Cameroon's regional market power into account, Cameroon would gain even more from free trade
than it would from implementing the CEMAC arrangements.
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Appendix:  Equations  of the  Model
Model Equations
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a;i  Scale parameter in the production function
,Bi  Share parameter in the production function
e;  Capital-Labor elasticity of substitution
a,j  Input-Output coeficient
Y;J  Scale parameter in the composite intermediate demand
ii  Composite intermediate imports elasticity of substitution
P;J  Composite intermediate demand elasticity of substitution
atu  Composite domestic supply elasticity of substitution
yi  Scale parameter in the composite intermadiate demand
3jJ  Share parameter in the composite intermediate demand
Scale parameter in the composite output
,Pi  Scale parameter in the composite exports
19  Share parameter in the composite output function
oi  Composite output elasticity of substitution
Ki  Composite exports elasticity of substitution
Xi  Scale parameter in the composite domestic supply function
ai  Share parameter in the composite domestic supply
Ai  Share parameter in the composite exports function
Hi  Minimum quantity of good i
i2i  Marginal budget share of good i
v;  Share parameter in the the composite final demand function
(Di  Composite final demand elasticity of substitution
r;  Composite final imports elasticity of substitution
35d;i  Share  parameter  in the composite  final  imports
Imireg,  Tariff  rate on intermediate  imports  from the regional  market
tmcreg,  Tariff  rate on final imports  from  the regional  market
tmirow,  Tariff  rate on intermediate  imports  from the rest of the world market
tmcrow,  Tariff rate on final imports  from the rest of the world market
tereg,  Tariff rate facing  exports  to the regional  market
phierow  Price in the regional  market
phimirow  Price  of intermediates  in the rest of the world market
phimcrow  Price of final goods  in the rest of the world market
red,  Export  to the regional  market  demand  parameter  derived  from calibration
rim  Intermediates  imports  from the regional  market  parameter  derived  from calibration
rcm  Final goods imports  from the regional  market  parameter  derived  from calibration
rii  Regional  export  demand  elasticity
LEi  Regional  demand  for intermediates  elasticity
pi  Regional  demand  for final goods  elasticity
K  Capital  stock
L  Total labor  supply  in the economy
TB  Trade balance---balance  of trade in goods and services
Variables
Xi  Output  of sctor i
Kd,  Demand  for capital  by sector i
Ldi  Demand  for labor  by sector  i
INT(i,  j)  Composite  intermediate  demand
IM(i,  j)  Imported  intermediate  of goods  I used  by sector  j
IMREG(i,  j)  Imported  intermediates  from the regional  market
36IMROW(i,j)  Imported intermediates from the rest of the world market
IDD(i, j)  Domestically supplied internediates
PID(i, j)  Domestic price of intermediates
PIM(i, j)  Domestic price of imported intermediates
PIMROW(i,j)  Domestic price of intermediates from the rest of the world
PIMREG(i, j)  Domestic price of imported intermediates from the regional market
PCM(i)  Domestic price of imported final goods
PCMROW(i)  Domestic price of imported final goods from the rest of the world market
PCMREG(i)  Domestic price of imported final goods from the rest of the world market
PVAi  Value-added price
W  wage rate
R  Capital rental rate
EXj  Composite exports
EXROW  Exports to the rest of the world market
EXREGj  Exports to the regional market
DSj  Composite domestic supply
IDSj  Domestic supply of intermediates by sector i
CDi  Domestically supplied final consumption
PXj  Price of composite output
PEi  Domestic price of composite exports
PEREG,  Domestic price of exorts to the rest of the world market
PEROW  Domestic price of exports to the rest of the world market
PCD;  Domestic price domestically supplied final consumption
PIDD;  Domestic price of good i  used as intermediate
QDj  Composite final demand
PQ;  Domestic price of the composite final demand
CMj  Composite final imports
37CMREG 1 Final imports  from the regional  market
CMROWV  Final imports  from the rest of the world  market
Y  Income  of the representative  consummer
E)  Commited  expenditures  in the LES fimction
PHIEREG,  Export  price in the regional  market
PHIMIREGJ Intermediate  imports  price in the regional  market
PHIMCREG,  Final consumption  imports  price in the regional  market
Tarif  Tariff  revenues  collection  by the Government
e  Exchange  rate (index  of the price of traded  to non-traded  goods)
38Figure 1: Trade Creation and Trade Diversion  with Differentiated Products:
with and without  regional  market  power.
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Supply  and demand  In the no regional market power  (nmarket  power) case are drawn with dotted (solid) lines. If tariffs  are reduced preferentially  against partner
country  importsJQom  t  uto  o, the wefare change  t  equal tofA+  B + CW  - Tr  - T2 (A-TQu-TJinthenomarketpower marketpower)case  Ignoringsimpovedaccessto
export markets,  the home country  will  gain more in the no market  power case  if the terms-of-trade  loss exceeds  the extra trade diversion  costs,  Le.  if and only if T 3
+ B +  C  > T2. Since B + T3  is  producers'  surplusforpartner country  suppliers,  it is not a loss to the region.
39Figure  2:  The Value of Preferential  Access to Partner  Country  Markets:
with and without  regional market  power.
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Quantity  Exported  to Regional  Markets
Regional demandfor home country  exports  is depicted  by solid lines with regional  market  power,  but dotted  lines with no regional  market  power. If tariffs are
reducedpreferentially  by partners, thehome country's  producers  surplus willincrease  by the areaABCD with marketpower, and by the areaABEFwith  no
market  power. There is an unambiguous  additional  gain, equal to DCEF, with no regional  market  power.
40Table 1.  Regional Economic Indicatoms  of CEMAC  Countries, 1994
Cameroon  Congo  Gabon  Equatorial  C. African  Chad
Guinea"  Republic
GDP'  7.5  1.6  3.9  0.1  0.9  0.9
GDP per  capita
2 576.9  615.4  3000.0  250.0  281.3  142.9
Share in regional  GDP  50.3  10.7  26.2  0.7  6.0  6.0
Population  (millions)  13  2.6  1.3  0.4  3.2  6.3
Area
3 475  342  268  28  623  1284
Sectoral  distribution  of GDP
(In percent)
Agriculture  19-  10  8  47  44  44
Industry  45  ~  44  52  26  13  22
Services  41  ~  46  49  27  43  35
Exports to CEMAC4  8.6-  0.1  0.0  n.a  0.5  n.a
Imports  from CEMAC
4 2.0-  3.1  5.2  36.9  9.1  25.9
In billions  of US dollars
In US dollars
3Thousands  of square  kilometers
4 Exports  and imports as a percentage  of the country's  total exports and imports respectively.
Source:  World Development  Report (1996)  except  for the trade indicators  which are from  the IMF Direction  of Trade  (1  996).
Data  for Equatorial  Guinea  are from UNCTAD,  Handbook  of Intemational  Trade and Development  Statistics
except for population  and GDP  which are from the IMFs intemafional Financial  Statistics.
For Cameroon,  authors estimates  based  on data provided by  the Department  of Statstics and National  Accounts,
Ministry  of Economy and Finance,  Cameroon.
41Table 2.  Cameroon: basic data for model calibration, 1989
Sectors  Output'  Value-added'  ExportlOutput




(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
AGR  896  708  12.1  451  2.3  2.0  5.0
IND  2624  1665.7  18.1  1838.4  49.4  2.0  10.0
SER  2439.7  1369.4  3.3  1832  6.4  2.0  5.0
'In billions of CFA Francs
2 Cameroon'  s imports and exports as a percent  of its imports  and exports of the product.
Source: Column (1)-(5): 1989  Input-Output  Table for Cameroon  provided by the Department  of Statistics  and National  Accounts, Ministry  of Economy and Finance,  Cameroon.
Colums (6)-(7): Authors' estimates based on data provided  by the Department  of Statistics  and National  Accounts, Ministry  of Economy and Finance,  Cameroon.
42Table 3: Values  of the Tariff  Rates  in the Policy  Simulations  (in percent)
Import  Tariffs  Imposed  by Cameroon  Export  Tariffs
Intermediate  Products  from:  Final  Products  from:  faced by Cameroon
Region  Rest  of World  Region  Rest  of World  in the Region
Pre-Reform  2.9  19.7  5.7  22.6  22
CEMAC  compliance  0  10.3  0  11.8  11*
*  The actual  export  tariff  faced by Cameroon  with compliance  is  zero. Since  CEMAC's  tariffs  to the rest  of the  world  are also  decreasing.
on balance  Cameroon  will only  obtain  an improvement  in regional  demand  of about  I  I  percent. See  text for  details.
Source:  Authors  calculations  based  on  sources  explained  in the text.
43Table  4. Assumed  elasticltes  in the model
Central  elastcity case
Sector
Agriculture  Industry  Services
Capital-Labor  substitution"  0.61  0.70  0.80
Composite  final demandb  1.00  1.00  1.00
Elasticity  of substitutionc
import-domestic
in  final  and  intermediates  1.40  2.10  2.10
Elasticity  of substitutiond
imports  from  the  region  vs.
imports  from  rest  of  world
in final  and  intermediate  goods  1.40  2.50  2.10
Elasticity  of transformation"
domestic  supply  vs.  exports  4.00  3.00  3.00
Elasticity  of transformation"
exports  to region  vs.
exports  to rest  of world  6.00  4.50  4.50
Elasticity  of transformationf
domestic  intermediates  vs
domestic  final  4.50  2.10  4.50
Regional  export  demandg  4.00  4.00  4.00
Regional  import  supply  of9
intermediate  and  final  goods  4.00  4.00  4.00
Sources:
a  Caddy  (1976).
b  World  Bank  (1995)  and  Lluch,  Powell  and  Williams  (1977).
c  Shiells,  Stem,  Deardorff  (1986).
d  Faini  (1994).
Interpolated  from  Faini  (1994).
Authors'  estimates,.
9  de  Melo  and  Tarr  (1992).  These  are  the  values  assumed  with  regional  market  power.
44Table 5: Welfare Results for Cameroon of Regional  and Unilateral  Trade Uberalization
(Wetfare  is in Hicksian  Equivalent  Variation  as a Percent  of Base  GDP)
POLICY  VARIABLES  WELFARE  RESULTS
Market  Power:
Regional  3rd County  TarH Free  Nowhere  On Regional On Regional On Regional
POLICY  Tarifs of  Tariffs of  Access  to  Imports  Only Exports  Only Imports  and Exports
Cameroon  Careroon  Regional  Markets
1.  2  3  4  5  6  7
1. CAEMC  (Full  implementation)  0  CET  YES  0.62  0.61  0.41  0.41
Decomposing  the Effects
2. Value of  Access  No  change No  change  YES  0.29  0.28  0.11  0.11
3. Extemal  Liberalization  Only  No change  CET  No  0.33  0,34  0.3  0.3
4. Value of Regional  Tariff  Reductio  0  No  change  No  -0.01  -0.02  -0.01  -0.02
5a.  Assessing  Trade  Diversion  CET  CET  YES  0.62  0.62  0.41  0.41
(compare  to model 1)
5b.  Assessing  Trade  Diversion  No change  CET  YES  0.62  0.62  0.41  0.43
Other  Policy Possibilities
6. Partial  Unilateral  Trade  CET  CET  NO  0.33  0.33  0.3  0.3
Liberalization
7. Complete  Unilateral  Trade  0  0  NO  0.5  0.51  0.45  0.45
Liberalization
8. Cameroon  Implements  the CU  0  CET  NO  0.33  0.33  0.3  0.29
but its Partners  do Not
9. Old Regionalism-  0  No  change  YES  0.28  0.26  0.11  0.09
Source: Authors'  estimates.
45Table  6: Sensitivity  of Welfare  Results  to Low  and High  Elasticities
(Welfare is in Hicksian Equivalent  Variation as a Percent  of Base GDP)
WELFARE  RESULTS
Market  Power:
Nowhere  On Regional  On Regional  On Regional
POLICY 1 Imports  Only  Exports Only  Imports and Exports
ELASTICMIES  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High
1. CEMAC (Full implementation)  0.42  1.09  0.41  1.08  0.24  0.76  0.24  0.75
Decomposition  of the Effects
2. Value of Access  0.23  0.42  0.23  0.42  0.10  0.15  0.09  0.14
3. Extemal Liberalization  Only  0.18  0.65  0.19  0.66  0.15  0.62  0.16  0.62
4. Value of Regional  Tariff Reduction  0.00  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  0.00  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02
5a. Assessing  Trade Diversion
(compare  to model 1)  0.42  1.09  0.41  1.09  0.24  0.76  0.25  0.76
5b. Assessing  Trade Diversion  0.42  1.09  0.42  1.10  0.24  0.76  0.26  0.80
Other Policy  PossibIlitIes
6. Partial Unilateral  Trade
Liberalization  0.18  0.65  0.18  0.65  0.15  0.62  0.15  0.62
7. Complete  Unilateral  Trade
Liberalization  0.28  0.99  0.28  1.00  0.21  0.93  0.22  0.93
8. Cameroon  Implements  the CU
but its Partners  do Not  0.18  0.65  0.18  0.65  0.15  0.62  0.15  0.61
9. Old Regionalism  0.23  0.41  0.21  0.40  0.10  0.13  0.08  0.12
Policy instruments for the scenarios  are the same as in table 4.
Source: Model Estimates
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